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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Goal
Demonstration of safety margins for critical points (circuits) has
traditionally been required since it first became a part of systems-level
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements of MR_E-6051C. 11 The
goal of this document is to present cost-effective guidelines for ensuring
adequate Electromagnetic Effects (EME) safety margins on spacecraft critical
circuits. It is for the use of NASA and other government agencies and their
contractors to prevent loss of life, loss of spacecraft, or unacceptable
degradation. This document provides practical definition and treatment
guidance to contain costs within affordable limits.
1.2 Statement of Problem
EMC critical circuit safety margin demonstration is essential for NASA
program success. The process used for both critical circuit identification and
margin demonstration is not clearly documented or widely understood. For
major programs, multiple (sometimes thousands) of critical circuits are
erroneously identified. If all of these circuits were actually critical the system
design would be fundamentally unsafe. Instead, many of these circuits are
identified because they support a critical function, although each circuit
identified is not critical. For example, a keyboard may be identified as critical
because it is used on a computer which controls a command which controls a
critical circuit. Contractors have seen these lists of circuits and been
overwhelmed with the magnitude of verifying an EMC safety margin for each
circuit. Another common misconception is in the area of the safety margin
demonstration process. Margin is sometimes added to the basic equipment
level susceptibility requirements instead of identifying the system level
environment-derived circuit specific margins. A clear process is needed to
eliminate those circuits which are not critical for EMC safety margin
verification and identify guidelines for the entire margin demonstration
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process. Such processes have been successfully used on NASA programs m
the past, but have not been documented for general use. This problem is not
unique as there are also no known documented general EMC critical circuit
process guidelines for military applications.
As referenced in this document, a critical circuit is a circuit whose
improper function, as influenced by electromagnetic interference, would result
in loss of life, serious crew injury, loss of vehicle, mission abort, or
endangerment of mission. Traditionally, system-level EMC specifications
have imposed requirements to demonstrate a safety margin between the
interference malfunction threshold (susceptibility) and the actual electrical
noise level present on the circuit, assembled into the system, under installed,
operational conditions. See Figure 1-1., EMC Critical Circuit Safety
Margins.
EMC CRITICAL CIRCUIT
MARGINS
,SIJ_CI'LP'I'[BII|_1"1_ "I]_IRE._I_IOIJ_
Figure 1-1. EMC Critical Circuit Safety Margins.
In practice, programs have limited the margin demonstration process to
interference resulting from internal signal or power circuits and the external
RF field environment. Other electromagnetic effects such as Electrostatic
Discharge (ESD), lightning, strong magnetic sources, or other special noise
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sources are treated as special casesand traditionally have not been part of the
formal EMC margin demonstration program. Any program may elect
however to treat these as a part of the EMC safety margin demonstration
process and develop the special methodology required. This document will
limit its treatment to the traditional intra- and inter- system noise coupling
modes.
Generally, the demonstration requirement is 6 dB on signal, power, and
control circuits and 20 dB on electroexplosive device firing circuits.
It is important to note that the EMC Critical Circuit process is an
additional layer of safety practices over and above the normal requirements
for good EMC engineering. It is assumedthroughout this document that a
high quality EMC engineering program to design and verify adequate
performance of the system has been carried out.
REFERENCE
1-1. MIL-E-6051 C, Military Specification, Electrical-Electronic System
Compatibility and Interference Control Requirements of Aeronautical
Weapon Systems, Associated Subsystems and Aircraft, 17 June 1960.
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TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT OF CRITICAL CIRCUIT
SELECTION PROCESS
2.1 Requirement for Safety Margins
The 6 dB margin (20 dB for electroexplosive devices) is well accepted.
These margin values have been shown to be adequate for systems safety and
performance and also technically achievable through experience with many
systems over a long period of time. They should be applied.
2.2 EMC Critical Circuit Selection Management
The military specifications which define the criticality categories for
margin demonstration requirements do not provide additional guidance
criteria for critical circuit selection. Program management should require a
dedicated, formalized process to be developed for critical EMC circuit
selection. This process should be documented in the formal planning
documents of the project with schedule milestones and progress reporting.
The process should be tailored to fit the needs of individual programs.
Systems Engineering, Electronic Subsystems Engineering, Safety, and
Electromagnetic Compatibility functions must all participate in the process.
2.2.1 Assignment of Responsibilities
One difficulty in treatment of EMC-critical circuits is the confusion in
organizations over responsibility assignments for the different tasks required
in the process. Often the view is that, since the requirement is specified in an
EMC standard, the EMC organization should be responsible for
accomplishing all aspects of the process. However, this view fails to
recognize that typically for large complex systems, EMC personnel have
neither the training nor access to the information required to apply the
selection criteria to identify those functions and circuits.
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Proper assignment of responsibilities throughout this process is
essential for success. Some relatively small programs may allow the EMC
specialists to become sufficiently familiar with all the system functions to
perform the entire selection process. However, for large complex systems,
EMC expertise may not be useful during the critical function identification
phase. Systems Engineering personnel should have primary lead with Safety
oversight and support as needed from system designers. That phase requires
assignment of personnel who must be knowledgeable of the overall system
design as well as the planned operational scenarios. Evaluations are required
of the credibility of many postulated modes of failure. Understanding of
operations and caution and warning functions is necessary to determine
credibility of failure recovery techniques. The flow chart of Figure 2-1., A_.
through G, is applicable to this phase of the process.
2.2.2 Apply EMC Expertise
EMC expertise is required in steps H through K of the selection
process of Figure 2-1. The documentation of candidate critical circuits
prepared by Systems Engineering during the first phase is the starting point
for the EMC engineer. First, the judgments of which circuits can reasonably
be expected to have some susceptibility to Electromagnetic Interference must
be made. Then EMC expertise is required to judge which circuits of
redundant sets are most vulnerable if such a distinction can be made. Finally,
the EMC engineer must document EMC critical circuits and plan the margin
demonstration.
2.3 Detailed Selection Process
The following details an approach which leads to more effective cost
control for the demonstration of safety margins for EMC-critical circuits. It is
a logical method to eliminate from consideration circuits not having adequate
justification for margin demonstration while ensuring that safety is not
compromised. It discusses the flow of processes, decisions, and
documentation illustrated in Figure 2-1. Activity Flow to Select and
Document EMC Critical Circuits. Each block of the flow chart is described
in the paragraphs following. Appendix A gives examples of the selection
process applied to circuits.
5
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A Design to Minimize Critical Functions
As indicated in Figure 2-1, this step is a process, not a decision step.
A significant consideration is the fundamental design practice which actively
seeks to minimize the number of critical functions. A philosophy of designing
failure tolerant systems underlies the safety, performance, and cost
containment process. Limiting the number of critical functions necessarily
limits the number of any subset such as EMC-critical circuits. While it may
not be the purview of the EMC engineer, the success or failure of the designer
in minimizing critical functions directly impacts program costs. Safety and
cost control can be allies at the beginning of the project if a dedicated task is
established to hold to a minimum the number of ways that functions can fail
catastrophically. Control of EMC costs for critical circuit margin
demonstration is directly affected by these early decisions since the EMC-
critical circuits are a subset of the critical function list.
The Systems Engineering and Safety disciplines should share
responsibility, with support from design groups, for performing this analysis
and documenting the result for engineering management review. The task
would consist of identifying critical function technical issues, performing
interdiscipline coordination, issuing specific guidelines where required,
analyzing failure effects, and documenting the results. Ground rules should
be established at the beginning of this task.
B Function Has Credible Critical Failure Modes?
The test of function criticality is the effect on crew or craft of a
credible failure of the function to perform its intended purpose at the intended
time or inadvertent actuation of the function at an unintended time. If the
result of such a credible failure is death or serious injury to the crew or
destruction of the vehicle, then the function must be considered a candidate
critical function.
Operational considerations should be taken into account. For example,
if a potential critical function is active or vulnerable for a limited period of
time and no threat of exposure is possible during that period, then it should be
eliminated from further study. Consideration also should be given to potential
changes in operational scenarios which would counter this logic.
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Any number of highly unlikely failure events can always be postulated.
Rigorous analysis is required of the operational conditions bounding a
proposed failure mode. Engineering personnel expert in operations and
effects should lead this decision step. Discipline is required to ensure that
only those that are truly credible are identified as critical. Critical functions
with non-credible failure modes must be eliminated from further consideration
to control costs.
The system design knowledge required may be outside the domain of
the EMC engineer. If the program is small enough that the EMC engineer
can be in the mainstream of the functional design, then he or she may be in
position to understand the mission consequences of any given functional
failure and so may legitimately participate in the identification of the critical
functions. However, some large programs may be so specialized and
compartmentalized in their technical assignments that the EMC engineer does
not have access to sufficient design information to make those determinations.
Strong systems analytic skills are necessary to document an understanding of
the failure effects. Good engineering judgment must be applied to ensure that
failure modes so identified are credible. A common mistake is to "play it
safe" and categorize many functions as critical to avoid the effort involved in
making accurate determinations. This kind of overkill approach drives costs
upward significantly. Another, and dangerous, approach is to "handwave"
the requirements and jump to the conclusion that there are no or few such
functions without doing the analytical work required.
Note that this process does not automatically result in all
Electroexplosive Devices (EEDs) being classified as critical. If a credible
rationale can be given that a particular EED cannot fail in a critical way,
further testing and analysis might be wasteful and it may be excluded from the
critical function category.
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C Automatic Notice of Failed Condition?
If a failed condition is designed to provide automatic notice to the crew
or operators of the system, there may be adequate time to take remedial
action. If such a warning system exists, consideration of the function should
be continued to the next decision step. If, however, no significant warning of
the condition is given before the effects become catastrophic, the function is
critical.
D Is Recovery Procedure Credible & Adequate?
This step presumes that the failure is obvious or a warning is
automatically provided and that time is adequate to allow a recovery
procedure. Any proposed recovery procedure should be evaluated to ensure
that it is credible and reasonable. This procedure should be a documented
part of the program. If such a documented procedure is found to be credible,
the function may be eliminated from further consideration. However, if the
recovery procedure is found to be inadequate, the function is critical.
E Document Identification of Critical Functions
At this point the list of critical functions should be documented along
with the rationale supporting the selection. Descriptions of the rationale
applied in the preceding steps are given in this phase of documentation. In
practice, this may be a living document which may be modified as the design
evolves and matures. It is the foundation for the selection process that
follows.
F
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Function Implemented on Electrical Circuits?
This is a decision step which identifies those critical functions which
are implemented through electrical circuits. It may or may not be a simple
step, depending on the complexity of the system. The objective is to identify
a list of circuits that can be considered as candidate EMC-critical circuits.
Any function which is found to be implemented by purely mechanical means
must be eliminated from further consideration. Those critical functions which
are dependent on electrical circuitry to some degree must be analyzed to
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determine if failure of the circuit can cause the function to fail critically. If
the critical failure can be propagated through the circuit, the circuit is critical.
G Document Candidate Critical Circuits
The circuits identified by the preceding process should be listed at this
point along with any supporting rationale used in making the decisions. This
list constitutes the candidate critical circuits and will be used by the EMC
specialists in the following steps.
H Circuit can be Affected by EMI?
The EMC specialists should study the candidate critical circuits list and
evaluate the individual circuits for obvious immunity to Electromagnetic
Interference. Circuits which, when examined by EMC personnel, are found
to be obviously immune to EMI should be eliminated from further
consideration. For example, a power circuit driving a simple DC motor is not
likely to be influenced by stray electromagnetic energy. Or similarly, a high
power relay is probably immune. Care must be exercised, however, to fully
understand the circuit, since some apparently immune devices may have built-
in sensitive circuit controls. Each of the candidate circuits must be
documented as to the rationale for EMC-critical acceptance or rejection.
Is Circuit Redundant?
Many critical circuits will be found to be redundant. At this point, if the
circuit is not redundant it is identified as EMC Critical. If it is redundant it is
subjected to the next decision step.
J Circuit Vulnerability Equal to or Greater than Others in
Redundant Set?
If the circuit under consideration is one of a redundant set it must be
examined relative to the other members of the set. It is cost-effective to test
the worst-case circuit only. Normal design practices will dictate the routing
of redundant circuit wiring through physically different paths, protecting
against a common cause failing the set's function. A worst case may exist if
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one circuit is physically routed so as to render it most vulnerable. Those
shown to be less vulnerable than the others in the set may be taken as having
margins greater than that demonstrated. Thus they may be eliminated from
further consideration. If such a distinction cannot be made with confidence,
then all members of the redundant set must be subjected to the test and
analysis process for demonstration of margins.
K Document as EMC Critical Circuit
The final step in the process is to document those EMC critical circuits
which require a safety margin demonstration. The rationale used in the
selections made in steps H through _Jare given in this document. Those
circuits which are firing circuits for EEDs are subject to requirements for
demonstrating a 20 dB minimum margin and other circuits for only a 6 dB
minimum margin.
11
3. ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
3.1 Wire-to-Wire Coupling Analysis
At the system level, the primary entrance and exit points for extraneous
electrical noise is through the exposed wire bundles which interconnect the
electrical equipment. To minimize intra-system wire-to-wire noise cross-
coupling, wire shielding and shield termination requirements, separation, and
routing by EMC category are imposed. This isolates the sensitive circuits
from the noisy circuits physically and by metallic shields and thus ensures
that cross-coupling will be minimized. Strong enforcement of shield
termination requirements must be a part of the systems EMC program. This
is generally sufficient to achieve required safety margins for wire to wire
coupled noise. However, circuits identified as EMC-critical should be
analyzed for wire-to-wire coupling based on the actual physical routing of the
circuit wires, frequency, and impedance characteristics of the commonly
routed circuits. Particular attention should be paid to circuits sharing
connectors. Typically, isolation from shielding and physical separation is
diminished when circuits pass through connectors together. Several coupling
algorithms are published. One of these is given below 3-_. See Figure 3-1.
Noise Producing Circuit
_, ,,-,,-,,--,,-,,
iCt2
s |
I M I
s
,WTIWWl
Susceptibile Circuit
R,t
Figure 3-1. Wire to Wire Coupling.
12
For a system of two parallel wires as illustrated in Figure 3-1, the ratio
of the voltage coupled into the generator side of the susceptible circuit to the
noise voltage is given by the following:
E2c,/Eo=[R1/(RI+Ro)'R2/Xc]+[XM/( RI+Ro)'R2c,/( R2c,+ R2L)]=Ko "f (1)
The fraction of the noise voltage appearing at the load end of the susceptible
circuit is the following:
E2L/Eo=[RI/(RI+Ro) R2/Xc]-[XM/( RI+Ro)'R2L/( R20+ R2L)]=KL. "f (2)
where
E0 = noise voltage in the interfering circuit,
E2c = noise voltage coupled in the generator side of the susceptible circuit,
XM = reactance component of the inductive coupling,
Xc = reactance component of the capacitive coupling,
E2L = noise voltage coupled into the load side of the susceptible circuit,
K_ = coupling coefficient, generator side,
KL = coupling coefficient, load side,
R2 = R2L" R2G/( R2L + R2G), (3)
f = frequency of interfering signal.
The following parameters and formulas must be known or calculated as
inputs to the above equations.
a 1 : 7.35lff 12 when I is in feet or 24. • 10 12 when 1 is in meters
a 2 :: _.40slO-_when using standard US units or 4.61-1cr7 when using SI units
1 = length of wires, millimeters (Inches)
D = separation of wires, millimeters (inches)
h = height above ground plane, millimeters (inches)
d = diameter of wire conductor, millimeters (inches)
d 1 = diameter of wire including the insulation, millimeters (inches)
K 0 = relative dielectric constant. For air, K0 = 1
K 1 = relative dielectric constant of the wire insulation.
S 12 := _]( D2 + 4.h)
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Keff:= KO t
C =Capacitance (in farads) between two wires above a ground plane.
C :=
|°I4"
M = mutual inductance (in henries) between two wires above a ground plane.
X M := 2.7t .f.M
l
Xe:-
(2"X "fC)
R 2(}
R 2 :=R2L,
R2L + R2G
The coupling coefficients thus determined may be modified (reduced) by the
common mode rejection of the victim circuit.
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3.2 Susceptibility to External Fields
3.2.1 Introduction
The wire bundles also act as antennas and must be analyzed for field-
to-wire coupling. The recommended process is generic and not limited in
application to critical circuits and other approaches may be developed from
the survey. However, a program might to apply the process to critical
circuits and use that information to improve confidence in the overall system
performance. The preliminary approach described herein is intended as a
practical, conservative engineering process to be used as a general screening
analysis to identify potential margin problems. The process is based on work
funded by the Naval Surface Weapons Center in Dahlgren, Virginia. The
basic work was performed by McDonnell Douglas, St. Louis. The approach
builds on an assumption of normal EMC system-level design practices and
wire routing. It is based on the disciplined application of the following three
quantifiable factors:
o
2.
3.
RF environment at the circuit
Coupling to the circuit wiring
Generic susceptibility of integrated circuits
3.2.2 RF Environment at the Circuit
The RF environment must be determined from all relevant sources of
information. The system communications and navigation specifications and
installation drawings should specify the characteristics of transmitted signals
such as average and peak power, antenna gain and pattern, directionality, and
physical mounting geometry of antenna locations. Such characteristics of
other RF systems that may be associated should be made available for
analysis. Other RF emitters not associated but nonetheless causing RF field
impingement on the subject circuit must also be evaluated. For example,
spacecraft in Earth orbit are exposed to RF emanations from ground-based
So1/rces.
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3.2.3 Coupling to Circuit Wiring
When the RF environment has been sufficiently described in terms of
power density (watts/meter 2) at specified frequencies, the data can be applied
to the following process to make a conservative prediction of the coupled
noise power. It has been shown that a wire bundle can behave efficiently as a
tuned dipole antenna. 3-2 Studies and experimental measurements on
receiving patterns for spacecraft wire bundles have demonstrated this
phenomenon. Measured patterns taken in an anechoic chamber in three
dimensions yield a random directivity of radiation with the maximums lobes
approaching the tuned dipole model as a limit. See Figure 3-2.
Figure 3-2. 3-D Antenna Pattern from Wire Bundles. 3-2
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Power received by an antenna is: 3-3
Pr= Pd.Ae (4)
where: Pr = Received Power
Pd = Power Density
A_= Effective aperture of the 1/2 wave dipole =1.64_2/4rr
= c/f; c = 3x108 m/see, f= frequency of consideration
Or Pr = Pd'l. 17X1016/t _ (5)
For fi'equency stated in terms of megahertz:
Pr = Pa" 11700/f_ (6)
Or: Pr = Pd'K
where K is a calculated coupling factor.
(7)
This formula has been verified by test to approximate the limit of
pickup on spacecraft wire bundles except at low frequencies. Below 300
MHz the predicted noise pickup becomes overly conservative, predicting
unrealistically high levels. The recommended practice is to assume the 300
MHz value for frequencies below 300 MHz. Figure 3-3, Received Power
Coupling Factor, shows the calculation of the coupling factor assuming
unshielded wiring.
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Figure 3-3. Received Power Coupling Factor.
An alternative, less conservative approach for calculating coupling at
lower frequencies is given by Javor. 3-4In terms of induced voltage, Vi, for a
given electric field intensity, E, on a wire of length of l meters and a height
above the ground plane of h meters:
Vi / E = (2n-lh) / 2 (8)
The power received on a circuit wire must also be modified by the_
effects of any wire shields and for the effects of any shielding enclosure in
which the wiring may be installed. As shown in Figure 3-4, shielding
effectiveness testing with the MIL-STD 1377 (Navy) test method in the range
of 1 to 10 GHz, wire shielding with two inch pigtail termination is almost
totally ineffective. 3-5 The two inch pigtail shield termination is considered a
practical manufacturing limit on spacecraft wire bundle assemblies. One can
usually expect the assembled bundle to be of less quality. By contrast, the
same test method performed for wiring with 360 ° shield terminations was
shown to have an effectiveness ranging from a minimum of 28 dB to a
maximum of 43 dB over the same frequency range.
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Figure 3-4. Cable Shielding Effectiveness per MIL-STD-1377.
For typical spacecraft wire bundles, it is recommended that a shielding
effectiveness of 0 dB be assumed for the frequency range between 1 and 10
GHz For frequencies below that, it is recommended that an effectiveness of
20 dB be applied for up to 200 MHz, decreasing log-linearly to 0 dB at 1
GHz.
Figure 3-5, Power Coupling Factor with Shielding, shows the received
power coupling factor with this shielding effectiveness taken into account.
This approach is admittedly conservative and a specific project may have
good justification for using greater shielding effectiveness. If justification
such as test data on the specific manufacturing process for shielding
installation exists, then it is prudent to use the less conservative values. The
analysis should also include the shielding effectiveness of any metallic
enclosure in which the wire bundle is contained.
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Figure 3-5. Power Coupling Factor with Shielding.
3.2.4 Integrated Circuit Susceptibility
3.2.4.1 Introduction
Integrated circuit RF susceptibility was determined in a generic way by
the Navy and McDonnell Douglas. 3-6 Power was injected into many samples
of a number of different device types. Thresholds were measured across a
wide frequency range using impedance matching fixtures.
3.2.4.2 Digital Logic Device Susceptibility
Figure 3-6, Digital IC Susceptibility, gives the results of that effort for
worst-case susceptibility for TTL and CMOS digital devices.
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Figure 3-6. Digital IC Susceptibility.
The data shown in Figure 3-6 represents the mid-point of susceptibility
taken by the study. Three levels of susceptibility were determined. The
lowest level is the threshold of exceedance of manufacturer's tolerance. The
highest level is that level that will ensure a digital upset. The level shown
here is a point of ambiguous response where a digital upset may occur.
3.2.4.3 Line Driver and Receiver Susceptibility
Similar data were taken for line drivers and receivers. The receivers were
found to be the most susceptible. Therefore the susceptibility data for
receivers characterizes the set. Figure 3-7, Line Receiver Susceptibility,
gives the threshold for receivers which caused a state change.
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Figure 3-7. Line Receiver Susceptibility.
3.2.4.4 Analog Device Susceptibility
Figure 3-8, Operational Amplifier Susceptibility, shows the
susceptibility of typical operational amplifiers. The data represent a level of
susceptibility for a 50 millivolt offset of the operational amplifier output. A
higher threshold can be used if greater offsets are allowed.
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Figure 3-8. Operational Amplifier Susceptibility.
3.2.5 Summing the Effects
The EMC engineer applies the information of this section to get to a
bottom line for critical circuits and overall system performance. The sum of
the effects of the RF environment, the shielding effectiveness of the system
and susceptibility of the components will yield a design margin. As can be
seen from the coupling and susceptibility graphs, as frequency increfises -
beyond 1 GHz, systems become less sensitive. The Integrated Circuit
Electromagnetic Susceptibility Handbook 36 gives a more complete
description of components tested.
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4. THE SAFETY MARGIN DEMONSTRATION PROCESS
4.1 Introduction
The process of demonstrating the required margins can vary
considerably and should be developed in detail in the EMC Control Plan with
close customer coordination. For very large systems, that must be assembled
in space, such as International Space Station, a combination of analysis and
test must be performed. A complete system-level test may not be possible
before launch due to cost and logistics considerations. No one general
process of analysis or test can be adequate for all situations. Therefore, the
actual process must be defined for each system.
An additional consideration is the process to assure that margins are
maintained over a long time period. There are instances of complex systems
that are reused many times. They are also subjected to design modifications
and can suffer damage (for example, damage to shielding terminations) from
the manufacturing environment. For such systems a rigorous program of
inspection and EMC test and analysis should be employed to verify that crew
and mission safety is not compromised by design changes or performance
degradation from damage.
The analytical methods of Section 3 can be applied when justified.
Recommended test practices are included in the following section.
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4.1.1 Conducted Noise Injection/Noise Measurement
4.1.1.1 Signal Circuits Susceptibility
4.1.1.1.1 CW Margins
Narrowband conducted interference is injected into the circuit by
capacitive, inductive, or direct means. This is accomplished in the laboratory
on engineering or qualification-type equipment. The interference level is
increased until a threshold response is reached. In most cases these data are
taken at discrete frequencies, i.e., four frequencies per decade. In some
cases, a continuous frequency sweep is possible if the susceptibility threshold
can be continuously tracked.
4.1.1.1.2 Transient Margins
Susceptibility thresholds are obtained in a manner similar to the CW
method above except that the injected interference is in the form of pulses of
varying widths. Data is taken for both positive and negative polarity pulses.
Pulse amplitude is increased until the circuit response threshold is reached.
These data are also taken in the laboratory on engineering or qualification -
type equipment.
Recommended Practice for CW and Transient Susceptibility Testing of
Signal Lines
Susceptibility testing for threshold determination is performed in the
laboratory on non-flight units. CW (continuous wave) susceptibility is
measured from 100 Hz to 20 MHz and to spikes of 1Its to 100Its duration. If
the obtained data indicates the necessity of expanding the frequency range,
additional frequencies and/or spike durations are evaluated. Since both ends
of a circuit (source and load) can be susceptible, the failure criteria of the
circuit is determined by the most susceptible end.
26
The methods for susceptibility testing are illustrated in Figure 4-1.
Injection of interference by transformer coupling is illustrated in Figure 4-1a.
This approach is typically used for low frequency (<200 kHz) CW injection.
Figure 4-1b illustrates interference coupling obtained by capacitor coupling
which typically is used for high frequency (>_200 kHz) CW injection. Spike
injections can usually be performed using either transformer or capacitor
coupling. In some instances, such as long duration spike injection, it may be
necessary to connect the interference source into the circuit directly as shown
in Figure 4-1c and 4-1d. When the interference source is directly connected
in series (Figure 4-1 c), care must be taken to keep the interference source
isolated from ground. In all coupling methods, three parameters are measured
during susceptibility testing.
For series coupling, the three parameters are:
(1) Interference voltage across circuit load;
(2) Interference voltage across the circuit source;
(3) Interference current, which is common to both the source and
load;
For parallel coupling, the measured parameters are:
(1) Interference current to circuit load;
(2) Interference current to circuit source;
(3) Interference voltage, which was common to both the source and
load;
By knowing the susceptibility of the circuit in terms of interference,
voltage and interference current, the system safety margin test is simplified in
that either voltage or current, whichever was easiest to obtain, can be
monitored for determination of the safety margins.
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Figure 4-1. Susceptibility Test Methods.
CW susceptibility is determined at a minimum of four frequencies per
decade ( such as 100 Hz, 200 Hz, 400 Hz, 700 Hz, 1 kHz, 2 kHz, etc.) and
spike susceptibility is determined for durations of l_ts, 101.ts, and 1001as. The
susceptibility data points are obtained by slowly increasing the interference
amplitude or spike duration until a circuit malfunction occurs. To preclude
circuit damage, the interference amplitude is not increased past 3 volts peak
to peak for CW interference or 5 volts zero to peak for spike interference. If
the circuit does not respond to these maximum levels, it is considered non-
susceptible. If the calculated damage level of a circuit is less the 3 volts peak
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to peak CW or 5 volt peak spikes, the interference amplitude is held below
the calculated damage level. If the circuit does not respond to amplitudes
below the calculated damage level, the susceptibility is considered equal to
the damage level. If a preselected frequency causes a significantly greater
susceptibility than other test frequencies, the frequency range near the
troublesome frequency is tested in detail to find any susceptibility peaks.
All susceptibility testing is performed in the laboratory with the
equipment under test connected in the configuration (including grotmding)
that is utilized in the flight vehicle. When susceptibility testing is completed,
the data points are plotted to give continuous amplitude versus frequency or
amplitude versus spike duration curves.
4.1.1.2 Power Circuits Susceptibility
Generally, CW and Pulse susceptibility of equipment power inputs is
determined through testing to the equipment-level EMI requirements. MIL-
STD-461 requires designing to meet specified injection levels. 4q These
levels are, in general, sufficient to support the demonstration of the required
safety margins on power circuits. However there is no assurance that the
assembled system will not result in degradation of the margin. While power
buses may or may not be defined as EMC critical, it is recommended that
they be instrumented and tested for a 6 dB margin in any case. This practice
is often helpful in demonstrating compliance with interface requirements of
large systems which cannot be tested as an integrated assembly.
Instrumenting the bus at the interface is a logical choice of location.
4.1.2 Signal and Power Circuit Interference
Measurements are made during system-level testing with all systems
performing and sequenced as required during flight or mission. The same
critical circuits examined for susceptibility earlier in the program are
instrumented to measure the operating environment noise levels. These
measured interference levels are then compared with the susceptibility levels
for each circuit to derive the safety margin.
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Recommended Practice for Conducted Interference Safety Margin Testing
The interference safety margins on the EMC-critical circuits are
established by monitoring the interference on the circuits and comparing the
observed levels of interference to the susceptibility thresholds of the circuits.
CW interference is monitored while all systems are operating. Spike
interference is continuously monitored while a simulated flight sequence is
performed.
The EMC critical circuits are monitored by inserting a breakout box in
the circuit, and connecting the necessary test equipment as shown in Figure 4-
2. Interference waveforms with only one predominant frequency can be
analyzed directly from the oscilloscope display. For complex interference
waveforms, a spectrum analyzer is used to facilitate determination of the
individual frequency amplitudes. In practice, oscilloscopes are used for these
measurements until it becomes difficult to determine the frequency. At that
point spectrum analyzers are inserted to measure the frequency content of the
interference.
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Figure 4-2. Interference Measurement Methods.
DC Power Buses
During a simulated flight sequence, transients on the buses are
continuously monitored. The buses are monitored with a memory voltmeter,
set up to measure spikes of 1 microsecond or greater duration, in conjunction
with an analog recorder to give a permanent record of each bus. In addition,
representative buses are monitored for voltage ripple with a wideband
oscilloscope during a simulated flight sequence.
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4.1.3 Radiated Testing Above Environment
The full-up system configuration is subjected to radiated RF electric
field intensities a factor of 2 or 10 above the equipment radiated environment
for the as-installed mission configuration. The specified noise environment
will likely be an envelope which has been established with best available
knowledge and is intended to include the effects of all RF radiated noise
sources. If the critical component of the circuit has a known susceptibility vs
frequency, the circuit may be monitored by a measuring device with
equivalent impedance in place of the component and measurement of
coupling be used to prove adequate margin. This type of test demonstrates
safety margins only for the field-to-system coupling mode.
4.1.4 Increase Circuit Sensitivity
Still another technique that has been used is to insert overly sensitive
(by the required margin) components in the critical circuit and demonstrate its
performance in the system level environment. This technique is most
appropriately applied when dealing with Electroexplosive Device (EED)
firing circuits. Since the use of actual pyrotechnic devices could pose a
hazard to the crew and system, dummy devices developed to indicate a power
received 20 dB below the minimum fire level of normal devices may be
inserted into the circuit instead of the EED. If a full simulated flight with
realistic RF field exposures is performed and the device does not indicate
power received greater than 20 dB below the flight device sensitivity, the
safety margin has been demonstrated. Likewise, a measuring device of
equivalent impedance may be used in place of the EED and the measured
value of coupled noise can be used to show adequate margin.
REFERENCE
4-1 MIL-STD-461D, Military Standard, Requirements for the Control of
Electromagnetic Interference Emissions and Susceptibility, 11 January 1993
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLES OF EMC CRITICAL CIRCUIT
SELECTION AND ANALYSIS
A-!
A.1 Examples of Selection and Analysis
Examples of potential EMC-critical circuits are postulated and
developed to demonstrate the selection and analysis process. A very brief
discussion of selection is given as it relates to the process steps is Figure 2-1.
It will be assumed that the system design is already fixed and the selection
process will begin with the determination of credible critical failure modes.
A.I.1 Selection Examples
A.I.I.I Example No. 1: A pyrotechnic firing circuit.
Function: Ignition of rocket booster motor for manned spacecraft.
Description: Inadvertent firing poses high safety risk for crew.
Operational requirements remove sating inhibitors 3 hours before
launch. Inadvertent firing would have immediate catastrophic results without
warning to crew. No recovery procedure is available. Function is
implemented by a NASA Standard Initiator (NSI) with a 28V firing circuit.
NSI susceptibility to RF interference is known. For this example, the
minimum no-fire level is given as 1 watt or 1 amp pin-to-pin. Circuit is dual
redundant. It cannot be demonstrated with confidence that either circuit is
more exposed or vulnerable than the other.
Circuit wiring description: Twisted shielded pair, AWG 18,
Kapton insulation, source and load impedance = 1 ohm, routed on dedicated
path exposed to external launch environment under vehicle access panel, no
other circuits in proximity. Shielding multipoint ground terminated. Length
of firing circuit = 10 feet. Height above ground plane= 2 inches.
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Selection Process:
A_ Design to Minimize Critical Functions.
In the example the system design has been completed and it is assumed
that this critical function is necessary.
B Function has Credible Critical Failure Modes? Yes
After the sating devices are removed the firing functions are vulnerable
to impinging RF energy. Inadvertent firing of the initiators yields catastrophic
results. Unintended firings have occurred on other programs in the past. This
failure mode is credible.
C Automatic Notice of Failed Condition? Yes
There is an indication of initiator firing by means of instrumentation.
Automatic notice is given.
D Is Recovery Procedure Credible & Adequate? No
Due the almost instantaneous nature of the explosives involved, there is
not sufficient time and no recovery procedure exists.
E Document Identification of Critical Functions.
The rationale for selection of this function as a critical function is
documented for use in the completion of this process.
F Function Implemented on Electrical Circuits? Yes
The design uses NASA Standard Initiators which are activated by a 28
volt electrical signal.
G Document Candidate Critical Circuits.
The documentation is a simple selection of those functions identified in
step E which are implemented on electrical circuits.
H Circuits can be Affected by EMI? Yes
The NSI has documented susceptibility to Electromagnetic
Interference.
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I Is Circuit Redundant? Yes
Circuit is described as dual redundant.
performing the same function.
That is, there are two circuits
J Circuit Vulnerability Equal to or Greater than Others in
Redundant Set? Yes
Because there is uncertainty regarding the relative vulnerability of the
redundant set, both of the circuits are taken as EMC critical.
K Document as EMC Critical Circuit.
This is the final documentation that describes in detail the rationale
applied in selecting this circuit. It is add to the list of circuits for which safety
margin demonstrations are required.
A.l.l.2 Example No. 2 Temperature sensing/control function
Function: Detection and correction of pressurized area over-temperature
condition.
Description: Monitor and actively control temperature of habitable area.
Commercial grade components used. Over-temperature conditions
result in a audible alarm and visual indication. Overall system has long time
constant response. Operational reality is that flight crew would become
aware of over-temperature since the catastrophic effect is not immediate, the
crew will have adequate time to perform manual work-around. Work around
operations are in place or planned.
Circuit and wiring description:
0 to 5 volt analog single ended, unshielded, high, and return sides
routed on different paths. The analog circuit has a source impedance of 1000
ohms and a load impedance of 1000 ohms. Routed for 25 feet inside of
pressurized volume adjacent to (average of 0.25 inch) 28 volt power bus,
non-redundant. Height above the ground has been estimated at 2.5 inches.
The bus has a predominant noise frequency of 3 kHz at 1 volt peak to peak.
It's source impedance is 0.25 ohms and load impedance is 0.25 ohms. The
wiring is AWG 20 gage and the insulation is Teflon. From wire tables it can
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determined that the diameter of 20 gage wire is 0.032 inches. From
engineering handbooks it can be found that the relative dielectric constant of
Teflon is 2.1. It is given that the insulation thickness is equal to the radius of
the wire conductor. Information resolution is 50 millivolts and the circuit
bandwidth is 6 kHz. Therefore a noise level in excess of 50 millivolts will
degrade the accuracy of the measurement.
Selection Process
A Design to Minimize Critical Functions
It is assumed that the design exists and that it has been determined that
this function is necessary.
B Function has Credible Critical Failure Modes? Yes
Failure effects include potential electrical equipment failure from over-
temperture and significant crew health hazard. Components used in the
design which have reliability limitations and similar failures have occurred in
other systems.
C Automatic Notice of Failed Condition? Yes
Alarm given when over-temperature occurs.
O Is Recovery Procedure Credible & Adequate? Yes
Sufficient time is available and recovery procedure exists. This
eliminates the function from further consideration.
A.l.l.3 Example No. 3 Experiment data bus.
Function: Provides experiment data to data relay system for transmission
to ground station and use by experimenter. Effect of lost or corrupted data is
of concern to experimenter but not a safety issue and does not
catastrophically effect overall mission.
Description: 0 to 5 volt digital data stream, line driver/receiver routed
on twisted shielded pair, shield multipoint grounded with 2 inch pigtail
terminations. Device susceptibility is unstated. Routed away from other lines
on external skin of vehicle. Vehicle flight attitude exposes the circuit to a 1
GHz radiated RF source that causes 80 volts/m to impinge on the wiring.
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A Design to minimize Critical Functions.
It is assumed the design exists.
B Function has Credible Critical Failure Modes. No.
This function cannot be justified as critical.
A.1.2 Analysis Examples
This section is provided to give examples of how analysis may be
applied to the margin evaluation of critical circuits. Since the primary entry
of interference into the systems is through noise coupled from adjacent wiring
or from RF fields propagated to the vicinity of the wire bundles, these sources
of noise entry must be treated. This assumes that the basic EMC design job
of electrical bonding, grounding, and the use of continuous metallic
enclosures (elimination of RF apertures) has been accomplished. Methods of
calculation of noise pick-up on system wiring are described. Then the
technique of comparing the predicted noise to the generic susceptibility of
integrated circuits is given.
A.1.2.1 Example No.1 Analysis
Taking example No. 1 again, it is observed that no other circuits are
routed in proximity. Therefore, no calculation of wire-to-wire coupling is
necessary. However, during launch the firing circuit is exposed to RF field
intensities on the external vehicle of 60 volts/meter at 8.2 GHz.
At 60 volts/meter plane wave field intensity, the power density is
E2/377 or 9.6 watts/m 2. Applying the dipole model of equation (6) and
making initial assumptions that the circuit is completely unprotected by
shielding, the power received is:
Pr = (9.6)(11700)/(8200) 2 = 1.7 milliwatts
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This pyrotechnic device is assumed to have a worst case susceptibility
higher than 1 amp or 1 watt differential (pin-to-pin). This noise pickup is
common mode and the circuit is balanced. Therefore, an extreme worst case
margin can be calculated assuming it is unprotected by shielding, and not
accounting for the high common mode rejection. The worst case margin,
even assuming that the noise is coupled differential mode, can be calculated
as 10 log(I/.0017) or 28 dB. This margin is adequate and no evaluation of
shielding effectiveness of the vehicle skin and wire bundle shielding is
required. Should it have been necessary to include the effects of shielding, a
very conservative assumption could be made, or it could have been
determined by test or by comparison to similar installations with known
shielding effectiveness. Some electroexplosive devices may have pin-to-case
susceptibility and it could be lower than the pin-to-pin thresholds. In such
cases the common mode noise would be compared to the pin-to-case
susceptibility.
A.1.2.2 Example No. 2 Analysis
Circuit example No. 2 can be analyzed as follows. Even though it was
determined that it is not an EMC critical circuit, normal design practice would
dictate some analysis to assure its proper function.
Applying the calculation technique given in AFSC Design Handbook
DH 1-4, Design Note 5B4, and inserting the parameters given in the.circuit
description yields the following A-1. Standard US units are used.
a 1 : 7.3510-12 when I is in feet or 24.lo-_2when I is in meters
a 2 : 1.405107 when using standard US units or 4.61-lcr7 when using SI units
1 = length of wires, millimeters (Inches)
D = separation of wires, millimeters (inches)
h = h_ight above ground plane, millimeters (inches)
d = Aameter of wire conductor, millimeters (inches)
dl = diameter of wire including the insulation, millimeters (inches)
K0 = relative dielectric constant. For air, K0 = 1
K1 = relative dielectric constant of the wire insulation.
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For the given set of conditions for this specific circuit:
1:-- 30
D := 0.2
h:--2.
d :-- 0.03 For AWG 20 wire
d 1 :--0.06 Assumes insulation thickness = radius of conductor
KO:-- l For air
K 1 := 2.1 For Teflon
f:: 300
E0:-- 1.o
R 0 := 0.25
R 1 := 0.25
R 2G := 100
R2L := 100
S 12 :-- "_(D2
/
Keff:- K0 _-
+4.h)
C = Capacitance (in farads) between two wires above a ground plane.
El--
IIh ll210 4. - -d 2 d
M = mutual inductance (in henries) between two wires above a ground plane.
a.
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X M := 2-n-f-M
l
X
c (2-_ .fC)
R2G
R 2 := R2L,
R2L+ R2G
The following equations yield the interference voltage at the generator
end and the load end caused on a victim circuit by a culprit circuit.
E0 = Culprit circuit Interference Source Magnitude
R 0 = Culprit circuit source impedance
R 1 = Culprit circuit load impedance
M = Mutual inductance between two wires
C = Capacitance between two wires
E2G = Victim circuit noise voltage on generator end
E2L = Victim circuit noise voltage on load end
R2G = Victim circuit source impedance
R2L = victim circuit load impedance
t' I II u I T 2/
Model of wire-to-wire noise coupling
{I("l" lE 0 • R 1 ÷R 0 t R2oIIi-_-R 0 "R2Gt R2L
XM ) R2L ]R 1 tR 0 R2G+R2L
= 0.879
= -0.874
=E2 G
=E2L
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Thus, the coupled voltage for this circuit is approximately 0.88 volts.
Clearly, it is well above the 50 millivolt allowable. At this point in the
analysis the EMC engineer should have some good ideas of how to improve
the system performance. Some combination of the following will provide
acceptable performance:
• Route as balanced, twisted shielded pair with high common mode
rejection instead of single ended, and unshielded.
• Separate further from the power bus.
• Use a bandwidth much more narrow if application allows it.
A.1.2.3 Example No. 3 Analysis
Circuit No. 3 is not exposed to wire-to-wire coupling but it is exposed
to external radiated fields. 80 volts/m for flee space impedance is
(80)2/377 or 17 watts/m 2 . Using the dipole model of equation (6) yields:
Pr = (17)(11700)/(1000) 2 = 0.199 Watts or say 200 Milliwatts.
From Figure 3-4 it can be seen that wire shielding effectiveness for this
type of circuit treatment (not 360 degree terminated) is negligible. Therefore
it may be assumed that the 200 milliwatts can flow into the line receiver.
Figure 3-7 gives the susceptibility threshold of line receivers at approximately
70 milliwatts for a frequency of 1 GHz. The indicated received RF noise-is
almost a factor of 3 above the threshold power. In a case like this 360 degree
shielding terminations would be required.
REFERENCES
A-1 AFDC Design Handbook DH 1-4, Design Note 5B4
A-10
APPENDIX B
APPROACHES TO THE DEMONSTRATION OF EMC
CRITICAL CIRCUIT SAFETY MARGINS
B-1
B.1 Approaches to the Demonstration Process
A discussion of approaches for demonstrating critical circuit safety
margins taken by large man-rated systems is useful in understanding the range
of acceptable possibilities. The following was taken from the EMC
documentation of the Skylab Airlock Module (AM) Vehicle (includes all
electrical/electronic systems) and the Solid Rocket Booster of the Space
Shuttle Program.
B.2 SKYLAB
B.2.1 Requirements
The definition of Critical Circuits for this program is quoted from MDC
Report H031, Electromagnetic Compatibility Control Plan for Airlock
Module. B-I
"Those functions or circuits which if susceptible to EMI could cause a system
response which would directly affect crew safety, to the extent of loss of_life,
or which would cause a mission abort, or failure to achieve a primary mission
objective."
The Contractual requirement for safety margin demonstration on critical
circuits is quoted from MDC Report H031.
"The AM, MDA, experiments, and assembled GSE will be subjected to
EMC tests to comply with the intent of the Safety Margin requirements of
MIL-E-6051C. These tests will determine if any undesirable interactions
exist between the flight AM systems, MDA, experiments, and GSE. MDAC-
East is required to demonstrate a Safety margin on all EMC critical circuits of
the Airlock Module.
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(1) To demonstrate the safety margin by test, susceptibility testing will be
performed as laboratory development tests at St. Louis on AM subsystems
(non-flight equipment). The critical circuits will be tested for susceptibility to
CW from 100 Hz to 20 MHz and for susceptibility to transient pulse widths
from one microsecond to 100 microseconds. These tests will establish the
susceptibility thresholds of the critical circuits.
(2) Circuits which are discovered to have thresholds much higher than any
expected noise level will be eliminated from further testing.
(3) Those remaining circuits will be monitored for CW and transient EMI
during vehicle systems testing while the AM and MDA were operated in
typical flight sequence.
(4) The interference data will be compared to the susceptibility threshold
data to obtain the safety margin."
"The AM/MDA will be subjected to a radiated level which is six dB higher
than the expected cluster radio frequency (RF) power level. This will require
that all AM/MDA systems be monitored while the AM/MDA was
simultaneously illuminated by the Skylab transmitters frequencies. If a
malfunction occurs, the radiation will be reduced until the malfunction
clears."
"The AM power buses will be monitored for transients during vehicle
systems testing."
B.2.2 Skylab EMC Critical Circuits
The following was excerpted from MDC Report EO333, Airlock
Module Electromagnetic Interference Test Plan. B-2 The circuits identified in
this plan were referred to as potential EMC-Critical Circuits. A list of these
circuits follows.
a°
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
Fire Sensor output for Fire Control Panel
Fire Control Panel output to C&W Unit
Rapid AP Sensor output to C&W Unit
CRDU (Command Relay Driver Unit) data input
CRDU ready input
VCG (Vector Cardiogram) Telemetry Parameters
B-3
°h.
i.
j.
k.
1.
m.
n.
o.
p.
q.
r.
s.
t.
Tape Recorder clock signal to Tape Recorder
Timing drive signal to Interface Box
Timing reset signal to Interface Box
Sample (3/4 word) signal to Interface Box
5.12 kB clock signal to Interface Box
RZ timing signal to Interface Box
TRS clock signal to Interface Box
Bit signal to Interface Box
Bit rate signal to Interface Box
12.8 kB signal to Interface Box
Digital insert signal to Programmer
Fine time insert signal to Programmer
HL data switch to Programmer
PSC Sync Signal to Programmer
B.2.3 Susceptibility Testing
Susceptibility testing for threshold determination was performed in the
laboratory on circuits involving 9 pieces of equipment (non-flight units). CW
(continuous wave) susceptibility was measured from 100 Hz to 20 MHz, and
to spikes of 1Its to 100_s duration. If the obtained data indicated the
necessity of expanding the frequency range, additional frequencies and/or
spike durations were evaluated. Since both ends of a circuit (source and
load) can be susceptible, the failure criteria of the circuit was determined by
the most susceptible end.
The methods for susceptibility testing are illustrated in Figure B.2-1.
Injection of interference by transformer coupling is illustrated in Figure B.2-
1a. This approach was typically used for low frequency (<200 kHz) CW
injection. Figure B.2-1 b illustrates interference coupling obtained by
capacitor coupling, which typically was used for high frequency (>200 kHz)
CW injection. Spike injections can usually be performed using either
transformer or capacitor coupling. In some instances, such as long duration
spike injection, it may be necessary to connect the interference source into the
circuit directly as shown in Figure B.2-1c and B.2-1d. When the interference
source was directly connected in series (Figure B.2-1c), care must be taken to
keep the interference source isolated from ground. In all coupling methods,
three parameters were measured during susceptibility testing.
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For series coupling, the three parameters were:
(1) Interference voltage across circuit load
(2) Interference voltage across the circuit source
(3) Interference current, which was common to both the source and
load
For parallel coupling, the measured parameters were:
(1) Interference current to circuit load
(2) Interference current to circuit source
(3) Interference voltage, which was common to both the source and
load
By knowing the susceptibility of the circuit in terms of interference voltage
and interference current, the system safety margin test was simplified in that
either voltage or current, whichever was easiest to obtain, could be monitored
for determination of the safety margins.
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Figure B.2-1. Susceptibility Test Methods.
CW susceptibility was determined at a minimum of four frequencies
per decade ( such as 100 Hz, 200 Hz, 400 Hz, 700 Hz, 1 kHz, 2 kHz, etc.)
and spike susceptibility was determined for durations of l tts, 101as, and
100!as. The susceptibility data points were obtained by slowly increasing the
interference amplitude or spike duration until a circuit malfunction occurred.
To preclude circuit damage, the interference amplitude was not increased past
3 volts peak to peak for CW interference or 5 volts zero to peak for spike
interference. If the circuit did not respond to these maximum levels, it was
considered non-susceptible. If the calculated damage level of a circuit was
less the 3 volts peak to peak CW or 5 volt peak spikes, the interference
amplitude was held below the calculated damage level. If the circuit did not
respond to amplitudes below the calculated damage level, the susceptibility
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was considered equal to the damage level. If a preselected frequency caused
a significantly greater susceptibility than other test frequencies, the frequency
range about the troublesome frequency was tested in detail to find any
susceptibility peaks.
All susceptibility testing was performed in the electronics laboratory,
with the equipment under test connected in the configuration (including
grounding) that was utilized in the flight vehicle. When susceptibility testing
was completed, the data points were plotted on graph paper and connected
with straight lines to give continuous amplitude versus frequency or amplitude
versus spike duration curves.
B.2.4 Safety Margin Testing for Conducted Interference
The interference safety margins on the EMC critical circuits were
established by monitoring the interference on the circuits, and comparing the
observed levels of interference to the susceptibility thresholds of the circuits.
CW interference was monitored while all systems were operating. Spike
interference was continuously monitored while a simulated flight sequence
was performed.
Two safety margin tests were performed on the AM. The first test was
performed during Airlock Systems Validation in which the interference on
EMC critical circuits was monitored while all systems were operated in
typical flight modes. Simulators for the Orbital Workshop (OWS)/Airlock
Module and Airlock Module/MDA (CSM and ATM functions) interfaces
were utilized to provide a realistic test configuration. EMC critical circuits
that exhibit an interference safety margin of greater than 12 dB were exempt
from further testing.
The second safety margin test was performed during AM/MDA
simulated flight. EMC critical circuits not eliminated in the first safety margin
test described above, were continuously monitored for spike interference
during a simulated flight. The OWS/AM interface simulator and the
AM/MDA interface simulators (for CSM and ATM functions) used in the
first safety margin test were also used in this test. Due to the prohibitive
amount of time required for a complete simulated flight, the EMC critical
circuits were monitored during an abbreviated simulated flight. The
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abbreviated flight includes nominal switching functions and the various
combinations of equipment operation, but eliminates a large amount of
"steady state" time between the different modes of operation.
All safety margin testing was performed with the AM and AM/MDA
located in a Class 6 clean room. The EMC critical circuits were monitored
by inserting a breakout box in the circuit, and connecting the necessary test
equipment as shown in Figure B.2-2. Interference waveforms with only one
predominate frequency can be analyzed directly from the oscilloscope
display. For complex interference waveforms, a spectrum analyzer was used
to facilitate determination of the predominate frequency amplitudes. In
practice, oscilloscopes were used for these measurements until it became
difficult to determine the frequency. At that point spectrum analyzers were
inserted to measure the frequency content of the interference.
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Figure B.2-2. Interference Measurement Methods.
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During and AM/MDA simulated flight sequence, transients on the
following 28 VDC buses were continuously monitored;
AM Bus 1
AM Bus 2
Regulated Bus 1
Regulated Bus 2
EREP Bus 1
EREP Bus 2
EPS Bus 1
EPS Bus 2
Sequential Bus 1
Sequential Bus 2
Deploy Bus 1
Deploy Bus 2
Transfer Bus 1
Transfer Bus 2
AM/CSM Bus A
AM/CSM Bus B
AM/ATM Bus 1
AM/ATM Bus 2
The buses were monitored with a memory voltmeter set up to measure
spikes of 1 microsecond or greater duration in conjunction with an analog
recorder to give a permanent record of each bus. In addition, representative
buses were monitored for voltage ripple with a wideband oscilloscope during
a simulated flight sequence.
B.2.5 Radiated Tests
During system level testing, both a radiated interference.and radiated
susceptibility testing were performed to verify RF compatibility.
B.2.5.1 Radiated Generation
With all AM fi'equencies being transmitted simultaneously during
Airlock Validation, the interference levels in the cluster (entire on-orbit
assembly) receiver's passbands were determined. The measurements were
made using noise and field intensity meters and their associated antennas.
B.2.5.2 Radiated Susceptibility
A minimum 6 dB radiation margin of safety for the AM and MDA was
demonstrated by simultaneously radiating power at the six primary Skylab
orbital frequencies at the mated AM/MDA while monitoring all systems for
proper operation. The 6 dB margin was assured by radiating levels that were
6 dB higher than the actual flight environment. The interference levels were
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obtained with a special test unit supplied by the MSFC. Approval for these
open field tests (outside shielded enclosure) was obtained in advance from the
appropriate agencies.
B.2.6 Test Results
Continuous Wave (CW) margin measurements on signal circuits were
found to range between 6 dB and greater than 29 dB. Therefore the CW
margins met the 6 dB requirement.
Continuous Wave measurements on the power buses demonstrated
wide safety margins except for a GFE High Intensity Light. This light
produced 4 volts peak to peak ripple (repetitive tinging spikes) at 21 kHz.
was removed and returned to the government for modifications.
It
Transient measurements resulted in two instances of inadequate
margins. Troubleshooting the source of these transients revealed that they
were caused by an improper switching sequence of a Light Dimmer Control.
This switching was performed by the flight crew during a phase of the
mission when such activity would be impossible during the actual flight. A
deviation request was submitted and approved by the customer.
Radiated Susceptibility testing resulted in discovery of susceptibility of
the Rapid AP Sensor. The failure mode was a false alarm. It was
demonstrated that the interference entry point to the equipment was through
the cable. A redesigned cable incorporating a ferrite type filter was
developed, tested and operated with the Rapid AP Sensor successfully
demonstrating the required safety margin.
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B.3 Solid Rocket Booster
The following contains excerpts from MSFC-RPT-694A, dated July
13, 1981. B-3
Six kinds of circuits were determined to be criticality category 1 or 2.
They were as follows:
a) Ignition and Separation Firing Circuits (16 Circuits)
b) Rate Gyro Assembly (RGA) (12 Circuits)
c) DC Power Buses (4 Circuits)
d) Thrust Vector Controller Actuator Delta Pressure (16 Circuits)
e) Pyrotechnic Initiator Controller (PIC) (40 circuits)
f) Solid rocket Motor Chamber Pressure (6 Circuits)
g) Distribution Switching Circuits
h) Thrust Vector Controller Servo Bypass
i) Thrust Vector Controller Actuator Signal input to SRB
Actuators
Margins for circuits in a) through f) (94 circuits) above were
demonstrated by test. Demonstration of margins for circuits g) though i) was
accomplished by analysis.
B.3.1 Safety Margin Demonstration
Electrical circuit compatibility was demonstrated during Shuttle
Integrated Testing (SIT), Flight Readiness Firing (FRF), and actual launch.
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Program constraints prohibited the use of normal EMC hardwire, continuous
monitoring of critical circuits and interfaces. The EMC verification was
performed using the on board telemetry measurement system. Specific
limitations imposed by the use of the on-board telemetry measurement system
included non-availability of some critical circuits for verification via
telemetry, and for those available, sampling at relatively low rates, when
compared to hardware monitoring. In terms of compliance verification, the
parameter (critical circuit) may be monitored less that 1 per cent of the time at
certain sample rates. While not verified 100% of the time, the sampled data
presents evidence of compatibility, and there was no reason to doubt the
validity of that data.
Critical circuits were divided into two classes, Ordnance and Mission.
Ordnance circuits were required to demonstrate a 20 dB safety margin
between undesired signals and signal levels required to activate ordnance.
Mission critical circuits were required to demonstrate a 6 dB safety margin
between undesired signals and signal levels required to activation. Two
specific examples have been chosen of demonstration by test and one of
demonstration by analysis.
B.3.1.1 Demonstration by Test
SRB and RSS PIC Capacitor Voltage
Plus or minus 1.5 volts was taken as the voltage limit which
represented a 20 dB safety margin while the commands to ann and fire were
not given. The report indicates that voltage measurements were within this
limit during the SIT, FRF, and launch. Because it activates ordnance, the PIC
is specifically designed to be immune to a severe interference environment.
The arming circuit input must be applied long enough (150 ms) to charge a
capacitor through a dc-to-dc converter. It is virtually impossible to couple
enough energy onto the circuit inadvertently to operate the converter for the
t ,arging period. Additionally the PIC output required the "FIRE" circuit(s)
be supplied with an activation signal of 28 volts for 1 millisecond. The
combination of multiple inputs and time required on each make the PIC
insensitive to coupled interference signals. But the effects of inadvertent
operation of ordnance are catastrophic. As a result, cases could be made for
both testing and not testing of PIC circuits. A reasonable compromise was
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used. The PIC capacitor charging voltage telemetry measurement shall be
reviewed post test on all PIC's. This can be justified as a post-manufacturing
test to verify no wiring or connection error applies voltage to the charging
(ARM) circuits inadvertently.
Since the PIC Cap data is sampled at five times per second, two successive
samples would represent approximately 200 to 600 milliseconds. The PIC
could charge to a level that would fire an initiator between two samples (less
than 200 ms), but two successive samples would be positive noncompliance.
Seven volts for any two successive samples constitutes a no-go.
Thrust Vector Control System
Secondary Rock and Tilt Delta Pressure
The safety margin was defined in terms of the pressure measurement.
This function was critical because the SRB separation depends on the
pressure decreasing to low level after burnout. If interference on the pressure
measuring circuit prevented the indicated pressure from showing accurate
decrease to the proper level, the SRB separation could not occur. In this
case, 6 dB was taken as equivalent to plus or minus 1100 PSID. This margin
was derived from design parameters. The largest error pressure reading
indicated during SIT, FRF and launch was +671 PSID, well within the limit.
B.3.1.2 Demonstration by Analysis
A typical circuit is used to demonstrate the approach used.
TVC Actuator Control
The servo valve delta pressure measurements are used in the Orbiter to
determine satisfactory performance of the servo. When the pressure
differential is excessive that servo channel is bypassed to neutralize the effect.
All four measurements on each actuator on both SRBs were reviewed post
test to verify that no interference approached a level that would cause a
bypass judgment without a valid fault. In addition, these circuits were not
considered susceptible to EMI because the system frequency response was
less than 10 Hz by design. This approach, while not showing a quantitative 6
dB margin, showed a margin did exist.
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B.3.1.3 Additional Testing
After the SRB verification report was issued and the successful flight
of STS-I, it was determined that some concern still existed in some areas. As
a result, it is indicated that additional testing was performed. The SRB Rate
Gyro signals were recommended for monitoring through telemetry during
launch and simulated flight for STS-2, 3, or 4.
The Main Events Controller (MEC) to SRB Interface were
recommended to be monitored during Orbiter checkout for the required 6 dB
margin.
The SRB buses A and B were recommended for testing at KSC by
monitoring equipment with frequency coverage to 150 kHz
B.4 Discussion of the Approaches
The different approaches to the process are discussed in the following
sections.
B.4.1 Susceptibility measurement
Conducted susceptibility thresholds were determined for the Skylab
program using breakout boxes on non-flight equipment for transient and CW
interference both in band and out of band for each circuit. A limitation of this
approach was that reliable measurements could not be obtained aboge 20_
MHz. However no conducted noise was measured above this frequency. A
different approach was used for the SRB program. No baseline for margin
determination was developed from test for the actual circuit performance. It
was assumed that the thresholds were defined by the specified minimum level
for circuit response and that the interference effects were linear.
B.4.2 Interference Margin Measurements
The Skylab program measurements were made of actual voltage or
current in the circuit over a wide frequency range using breakout boxes
except during the 6 dB radiated susceptibility measurements when the
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breakout boxes were removed. A negative effect of using breakout boxes
during simulated flight is that extraneous interference could be introduced
which would not normally be present. However the resulting tendency would
be to err in the direction of conservatism and any safety margin demonstrated
would be a minimum level.
The SRB program used some flight telemetry readouts which were
related to the critical circuits. The advantage of this approach was that the
parameters could be monitored during that actual Flight Readiness Firing Test
and actual launch. This was definitely a more realistic condition than could
be simulated. However, since test planning occurred after the vehicle was
built, existing measurements and methods were not always adequate measure
margins. There was no baseline susceptibility determined in terms of the
voltage or current thresholds vs frequency of the circuits. Margin pass/fail
criteria were established on terms of the physical parameter deviation from an
assumed nominal as measured by the on-board telemetry system. Each
critical circuit had to be assessed to determine how a margin could be verified
by using existing measurements only. Since the telemetry readings were
sampled, there is no assurance that transients exceeding the safety margin
requirement did not occur between sampling periods in some cases. In
addition, some critical circuits could not be monitored. Even though these
methods produced less than perfect results in some cases, the process does
show that safety margins can be proven by the use of existing measurements
as long as a process has been defined to determine how these measurements
indicate a safety margin. In addition, if any undesirable or unexplained
effects were seen in the data, fiu_er evaluation would be required.
B.4.3 Conclusion
Two different approaches to safety margin demonstration have been
presented. The differences were the result of different technical approaches
and different funding priorities of the program management. The ultimate
result is that both programs were successful. In the final analysis the method
of margin demonstration must be determined from the judgment of the
program management and technical advisors.
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APPENDIX C
EMC DESIGN GUIDELINES
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C.I. EMC Design Guidelines - Background
MIL-STD 1818A requires that margins be included in the design
process, c-_ A number of EMC design approaches and variations could be
applied to achieve protection of critical circuits. A general rule of thumb is,
however, that successful system-level EMC design is at its foundation based
on the proper equipment-level specifications, design, and verification.
Equipment-level requirements are usually given as MIL-STD-461,
Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference Emissions and
Susceptibility, or a modified version of it. c-2 This is where initial gains are
made in the control of emissions and susceptibility. For the purposes of this
document, it is assumed that this proper foundation has been successfully
achieved.
System design for EMC applies design rules in the form of system-
level requirements. The requirements are sometimes given as guidelines or
design goals, but generally this approach is not effective. Key requirements
stated in general terms follow.
C.2 Grounding
The term grounding is a holdover from the practice of making an
electrical connection of one polarity of earth-based power, radio, or other
signal systems to the earth. As applied to space vehicles, grounding simply
means connecting one side of a circuit to the primary metal structure or
ground plane of the spacecraft. An excellent discussion of grounding, the
different variations of grounding configurations, and the relative advantages
and disadvantages of specific practices is given in NASA Reference
Publication 1368 c'3.
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C.2.1 Power System Grounding
Grounding for power distribution systems have special requirements as
described in the following sections.
C.2.1.1 Safety Grounds
One reason for grounding power circuits is for safety in case of a short
circuit. By making a low resistance connection to one side of a power circuit
to primary structure, accidental shorts to structure from the other side cause a
current flow that is large enough to activate the circuit protection device, fuse,
or circuit breaker. The generally accepted convention is to ground the
negative side of the power bus. Power conditioning solid state devices have
been developed for this convention.
C.2.1.2 Electrical Noise Control
Another benefit of grounding the power circuit is the shunting of
conducted noise into the ground plane and away from electronic units
connecting to the bus. It should be noted that the electrical noise is not only
diverted from the negative side of the system but also, for frequencies up to
several tens of megahertz, noise from the positive side. This is due to the low
impedance of the power source and loads for those noise frequencies relative
to the parasitic capacitive and inductive reactance of the wiring. This
increases the effectiveness of the power circuit noise filters in the source and
loads. Floating (ungrounded) power distribution circuits tend to be noisy.
C.2.1.3 Grounding - Single or Multipoint
Power systems can be single or multiple point grounded. In general a single-
point ground should be specified. When applied with wire routing discipline
this practice reduces the likelihood of unintentional coupling of power system
noise into sensitive instrumentation or control circuits. When the high and
return sides are on wires in close proximity (or twisted if possible) the
resulting coupling field surrounding the power circuit is minimized due to the
self-canceling tendency of the associated fields. This results because the high
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and low side currents are always equal and opposite. Single-point grounding
for power circuits is the lowest risk approach technically.
For certain systems a case may be made to use the vehicle structure as
a power carrying conductor. For example, the Space Shuttle Orbiter uses the
payload bay structure to carry the primary power return current between
forward and aft sections of the vehicle saving hundreds of pounds of copper
wire. Special design constraints were imposed which allow this practice.
The payload bay structure is an electrically low impedance with specific
requirements on the electrical bonding of the sections so that the power return
current cannot develop significant voltages. Most of the sensitive electronic
equipment of the Orbiter is located in the forward and att avionics bays well
removed from the payload bay. The power distribution in the volumes
containing avionics bays is single-point grounded. The significant signal
circuits routed through the payload bay are high-level data bus signals carried
on twisted shielded pairs and enclosed in metallic wire trays. By applying
such special considerations to the system design, the multiple-point grounded
power distribution system is accommodated. Other cases may justify using
the structure as a power carrying member. But each case should be
considered on its own merit. It should be noted that relaxing the requirement
for power circuit single-point grounding may be expedient and even proper
for a given situation, but in so doing, the systems designer reduces the
flexibility of design choices and may have to impose other special
requirements.
C.2.2 Signal Grounding
Single-point grounding is recommended for each signal circuit. If a
signal is connected to structure at more than one point, the signal becomes
exposed to other power, signal, or noise currents that may be flowing through
the structure. The structure becomes a part of the signal circuit. Multipoint
grounding of signal circuits also makes the circuit more vulnerable to wire-to-
_vire and field-to-wire noise coupling. Likewise, if a group of signals share a
return wire, they also share the noise voltage developed across the common
impedance. When the high and return sides of the circuit are routed closely
adjacent (and preferably twisted), any noise coupled will be equal on both
high and low sides. That is, the coupled noise will be common mode and
only that part that becomes differential will affect the signal. Now if the
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return side is through structure or shared with structure, it is not possible to
have equal coupling for both sides and a large amount of differential mode
noise will appear on the signal. The reciprocal of that is also true. Signal
circuits routed on twisted high and return side (or closely adjacent) wires will
tend to self-cancel their generated noise. At any point, the signal current will
tend to be equal and opposite. However, this balance is destroyed if
multipoint grounding is used and the circuit becomes a noise source.
C.2.2.1 Control of System Grounding
The system EMC designer needs certain requirements placed at the
equipment level to control the overall design of the system grounding.
Equipment should be specified to have a high degree of mutual electrical
isolation internally (typically 1 Megohm) between power circuit returns,
signal circuit returns, and equipment chassis. This allows the system designer
who must specify the interconnection configurations freedom to choose the
physical locations of the ground reference points. Optimum locations can be
chosen for the design and later if unplanned or uncontrolled situations
develop revealing EMC problems in system test the system grounding
configuration can be modified. If power or signal grounds are connected to
chassis internal to the equipment enclosure, this freedom to design and
modify is lost. Typically, a program may impose the use of Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE) or Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) equipment
which may not meet the needed isolation requirements. Also, radio frequency
(RF) equipment such as transmitters and receivers may, of necessity, have
signal referenced to equipment chassis. By maintaining the general isolation
requirements on equipment that can be speeified, the designer's ability to deal
with problems caused by the non-compliant equipment is improved.
C.2.3 Electrical Bonding
Sometimes the word bonding as used by the EMC community is a cause of
misunderstanding and confusion. As used in this document, bonding means
the electrical connection by special means of members that do not normally
conduct intentional system electrical power or signal current. General
bonding requirements are given in MIL-STD-5087B or MIL-STD-1541. This
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document will not attempt to repeat all the requirements in those references.
General rationale for certain practices will be described.
C.2.3.1 Class A Bonding (Antenna Installation)
This class of bond requires a ground plane with negligible impedance
at the antenna operating frequency and a low impedance path for the RF
return current.
C.2.3.2 Class C Bonding (Current Return )
The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that electrical hazards are
minimized by providing a safe structural current return path for intentional
currents and accidental faults (shorts to structure). For intentional structure
current paths, voltage drop limits are specified as a function of the power
system voltage levels. For fault current paths the resistance of the electrical
bond must be low enough to allow sufficient fault current to activate the
circuit protection device without overheating the connection point(s).
Specific maximum resistance values are given in MIL-B-5087B for locations
where hazardous fuels and gasses may be present.
C.2.3.3 Class H Bonding (Shock Hazard)
This category of bond provides personnel safety by ensuring low
resistance to structure between electrical or electronic equipment and exposed
conducting frames, as well as metallic conduit that carries electrical wiring.
A maximum resistance of 0.1 ohm is specified.
C.2.3.4 Class L Bonding (Lightning Protection)
Most spacecraft are not required to comply with these requirements for
direct lightning protection bonding since they do not operate exposed at the
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earth's surface or in the atmosphere. However, some launch systems may
require safe survival when exposed to specified secondary effects.
C.2.3.5 Class R Bonding (Radio Frequency)
This type of bond is of particular concern to the EMC specialist. The
intent is to provide connections of very low impedance for RF noise to flow
between elements such as equipment chassis to primary structure, conducting
items near antennas, and interfaces between primary structural members.
These low impedance connections provide a preferred path for RF noise and
tend to divert it from sensitive signal circuits. It is important to keep the
purpose in mind when considering specific implementation schemes.
C.2.3.5.1 Preferred Implementation
The preferred implementation method is direct electrical contact
between the surfaces. Maximizing the area of contact reduces the impedance,
thus improving the effectiveness of the bond. This requires the application of
certain processes. The surfaces must be cleaned of all dirt, grease, and
nonconducting finishes. When the surfaces are mated, appropriate sealing
protection against corrosion should be applied. If bare metal surfaces are
mounted in contact, care must be exercised to avoid using dissimilar metals to
prevent corrosion problems.
C.2.3.5.2 Verification
The actual requirement is a maximum resistance of the Class R bond of
2.5 milliohms. However, this requirement can be met through a junction
which has high impedance to the RF noise. The best assurance beyond the
resistance measurement is review of the installation drawings for proper
process specification call-outs and inspection of the actual installation.
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C.2.3.5.3 Bond Straps
If surface-to-surface bonding cannot be accomplished, bond straps may
be used to achieve the low impedance connection. Thin solid metallic
conductors offer low inductive reactance. Skin depth of radio frequencies
allows use of relatively thin conductors. A rule of thumb is to use straps with
a maximum 5:1 length-to-width ratio.
C.2.3.5.4 Bonding Considerations for Shield Terminations
Proper termination of wire shields requires attention to minimize RF
impedance. R is very important to the effectiveness of wire shields that low
impedance terminations be used. For EED firing circuits with stringent safety
margin requirements, the shields should be terminated continuously through
360 degrees of the periphery of the wire. This is best accomplished with
special connector hardware. Other circuit shielding can be connected with
very short "pigtails" to the backshell of RF connectors with tag-rings. The
connectors must be designed for low impedance between the two halves of
the shell and have a conductive shell surface to mount to the equipment
chassis. The equipment must then have a high-quality RF bonding connection
to its mounting surface.
C.2.3.6 Class S Bonding (Static Charge)
Electrostatic charge buildup between isolated conductive elements can
result in electrical breakdown and arcs that cause electrical interference.
Charge buildup can result from frictional action of materials or fluids. It can
also occur on space systems as a result of energetic electrons found at
geostationary altitudes and, in some cases, at low Earth orbit altitudes with
high orbital inclinations. The MIL-STD-5087B requirement for prevention of
electrostatic charge buildup is a connection resistance of 1 Ohm maximum.
Experience has shown that this value is extremely conservative. However, in
most cases it can be easily met. If concern about a specific electrical
charging problem exists, the case should be analyzed and a design
implementation that is adequate for protection and economically reasonable
imposed. For example, if a spacecraft is predicted to be subject to auroral
electrons from magnetic storms, the charging rate and the resistivity of
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surface materials should be analyzed to determine if dedicated static bonding
protection is needed. If it is needed then candidate bonding implementation
methods should be quantified for effectiveness.
C.2.4 Wire Routing
One of the most important aspects of system-level EMC design is the
treatment of wiring connections between equipment and subsystems. Wires
which carry EMC-critical circuits need particular attention. Wire-to-wire
coupling of electrical noise can seriously degrade system performance. Over
the years, rules for circuit classification and separation have been developed
and applied to various programs. The purpose of this practice is to ensure
that sensitive circuit wires are placed at a safe distance from noisy circuits.
C.2.4.1 EMC Wire Classification
A system of classification is applied to identify and label the type of
circuit for each wire. The following table has evolved from the Space Shuttle
Program. It has been modified for the Space Station Freedom Program by
testing and analysis performed by the Electromagnetics and Aerospace
Environments Branch at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center. Further
adaptations have been made for this document. Classifications are defined in
terms of voltage or sensitivity, operating frequency, rise and fall times for
pulses, and load and source impedance. While the classification is to some
degree arbitrary, it reflects years of experience, improvement, and
simplification.
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Wire EMC Classification Guide
Frequency
Rise, Fall
Time (ms)
tr r tf
Analog
(ae,&)
f<=-50 kHz
tr,t_lOp s
50kHz<f
=<4MHz:
tr,tf=<10/a s
f>4MH
Voltage or
Sensitivity
<=-100mV
<=-100mV
<6V
6-40V
>40V
<100mV
=>lOOmV
All
Source
Impedance
(ohms)
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
Load
Impedance
(ohms)
<600k
-->600k
All
All
All
All
All
All
Circuit
Class
NIL
ML
ML
HO
EO
RF
RF
RF
Wire Type
TWS
TWDS
TWS
TW
TW
TWDS
TWS
TWS
Shield
Ground
MPG
MPG
MPG
None
None
MPG
MPG
Acronyms
and
Abbreviations
ML, HO, EO
MPG
RF
TW
TWDS
TWS
Arbitrary nomenclature to define,
circuit classification
Multiple Point Ground
Radio Frequency
Twisted
Twisted Double Shielded
Twisted Shielded
1. Shield Grounding shall be compatible with the circuit
application.
2. The length of termination-to-ground lead for all circuits shall be
the minimum length practical. The preferred method is to connect the
shield peripherally to the backshell of the connector with continuous
low impedance electrical bond path through both halves or the
connector shell and the connector to mounting surface interface.
3. Digital signals shall be classified as RF.
C.2.4.2 Wire Separation
The system wire bundles are then fabricated and installed on the
vehicle according to the separation rules for the classification. Each bundle
must contain only wires of the same classification. Bundles may be routed
together with no separation with bundles of the same classification for any
distance. Bundles of different classifications may be routed in parallel with
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no separation for distances equal to or less than 2 feet. Bundles with different
classifications may be routed in parallel with a minimum of one inch
separation for distances equal to or less than 8 feet. Bundles with different
classifications may be routed in parallel with a minimum of two inches
separation for distances greater than 8 feet. It is understood that in practical
systems there will be some instances of noncompliance due to volume and
access limitations. These instances should analyzed on a case-by-case basis
and well documented.
C.2.4.3 Wire Treatment for Electroexplosive Device Circuitry.
Firing circuits for (EEDs) require special attention. MIL-STD-1576
provides explicit detail on all aspects of EEDs. The recommended treatment
for firing circuit wiring is as follows;
• Label EED firing circuits separately and distinctly.
• All EED firing circuits shall be routed on twisted shielded pairs.
• Shields terminated at a connector shall provide 360 ° continuous shield
continuity without gaps.
• Route the firing circuits a minimum of 2 inches from all other bundles.
• EED circuits may be routed within one bundle and share an overshield
provided that current induced by one circuit within another is less than
20 dB below the no-fire current level of the EED.
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